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I. THE CONTEXT OF EU LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
A workshop aiming to narrate the history of EU Law took place in 
November 2012 at a critical time for the very existence of the Union 
and its role as a global actor.1 On the one hand, the current financial 
crisis is weakening some of the foundations and values that, in the 
last sixty years, EU lawyers, judges, and scholars have relied on.2 On 
the other hand, the U.S. government is pursuing a Transatlantic Free 
Trade and Investment Agreement with the EU, aimed at creating a 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, JD Turin Law School, PhD 
Trento University, SJD Harvard Law School. I would like to thank all the 
participants of the workshop, the New Historians for their commitment to further 
our knowledge of European integration, and to the International Law Review 
students for their patience and hard work on this symposium, in particular Cindy 
Gierhart and Jeremy Kelley. 
 1. The workshop, titled “Toward a New History of EU Law,” was held at the 
American University Washington College of Law on November 7, 2012. Morten 
Rasmussen, Mark Pollack, Francesca Bignami, and Bill Davies—all authors in this 
special issue—participated in the workshop. 
 2. See Jürgen Habermas, Peter Bofinger, & Julian Nida-Rümelin Only  
Deeper European Unification Can Save the Eurozone, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9,  
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/09/deeper-european-
unification-save-eurozone; Abraham Newman, Austerity and the End of the 
European Model, FOREIGN AFF. (May 1, 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/137611/abraham-newman/austerity-and-the-end-of-the-european-model. 
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Western bloc to resist the rising Chinese power.3 The fascination of 
current EU law scholarship lies in either one or the other camp. For 
instance, by reflecting on the regulatory and political failures of the 
EU, scholars have exposed European integration as legitimated by a 
messianic project relying on the promise of a better future, rather 
than on a solid constitutional and democratic culture.4 In contrast, by 
praising the EU as a global actor, others have shed light on the 
Union’s unique identity and its counterhegemonic role vis à vis the 
United States.5  
Both fascinations leave EU law scholars and practitioners 
unsatisfied with the portrayal of EU law and more fundamentally its 
achievement or failure in shaping European integration. After sixty 
years of European law and jurisprudence, critics of the messianic 
project ask lawyers who have flirted with the notion of its 
constitutionalization, ranging from a narrow federalist to a more 
pluralist focus, to acknowledge that the Schuman vision6 and its 
dream are lost today.7 In this view, lawyers were essentially coopted 
by a constitutional narrative put forward by Europhile elite, a quasi-
revolutionary vanguard, building the foundations of the Union on a 
thin legal legitimacy.8  
In contrast, scholars who emphasize the EU’s global anti-
 
 3. See Nicholas Kulish & Jackie Calmes, Obama Bid for Europe Trade Pact 
Stirs Hope on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/02/14/world/europe/obama-bid-for-trade-pact-with-europe-stirs-hope.html? 
hp&_r=1&pagewanted=all&. 
 4. See J.H.H. Weiler, Editorial, 60 Years Since the First European 
Community: Reflections on Political Messianism 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 303 (2011). 
 5. See Gráinne de Búrca, Europe’s Raison D’Etre, in THE EUROPEAN 
UNION’S SHAPING OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Dimitry Kochenov & 
Fabian Amtenbrink eds., 2013); Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (2012). 
 6. Referring to the philosophy of the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, 
which suggested a supranational integration of French and German coal and steel 
industries that led to the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community in 
1951. For an insightful analysis on Robert Schuman’s vision, see, Catherine M.A. 
McCauliff, Union in Europe: Constitutional Philosophy and the Schuman 
Declaration, May 9, 1950, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 441 (2012). 
 7. See Joseph H. H. Weiler, Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of 
European Integration: An Exploratory Essay, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 157−58 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2013). 
 8. See JACOB LEIB TALMON, POLITICAL MESSIANISM: THE ROMANTIC PHASE 
(1985). 
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hegemonic project depart from EU law techniques and formalities 
concerning the single market and the internal struggles to concentrate 
instead on the external action of the EU. By focusing on EU law’s 
extraterritorial reach and its unilateralism with respect to global 
policies, the Union appears as a superior and benign actor when 
played against other hegemonic players such as the United States and 
China. The external focus helps to strengthen the Union’s identity at 
a time of deep crisis. 
This collection of articles spurred by the New Legal Historians 
offers a third way to reflect, in an interdisciplinary manner, on what 
EU law scholarship has accomplished until now and how it has 
shaped our shared European legal culture. Among the goals attained 
by the New Legal Historians, there is a commitment to better 
understand how legal change has occurred in EU law through critical 
legal histories of understudied everyday practices. The aim is to offer 
new and multiple narratives to shed light on Europe’s past with 
implications for its future.9  
Since the late 1970s the work of political scientists and legal 
scholars has shaped what we perceive today as a shared European 
legal culture with strong ties across the Atlantic.10 By “legal culture” 
or “legal consciousness,” I refer to a set of arguments, modes of 
thinking, conflicting ideologies, training skills, shared knowledge, 
and social practices used by legal elites at a particular historical 
moment. Sixty years is a relatively short timeframe to give birth to a 
shared and coherent European legal culture, which is per se a 
remarkable achievement. The shaping of what lawyers and political 
scientists perceive as a well-established EU legal culture, however, 
has happened at the expense of foreclosing other avenues.11  
This workshop is part of a broader effort to shed light through the 
 
 9. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 112 
(1984). 
 10. See Daniela Caruso, EU Law in U.S. Legal Academia, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 175 (2011) (examining the evolution of EU legal scholarship and culture 
in the U.S. legal academia). 
 11. See Karl Klare & Dennis M. Davis, Transformative Constitutionalism and 
the Common and Customary Law, 26 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 403 (2010). As the 
authors put it, “The discursive structure of a legal culture gives content to, but also 
constrains, the legal imagination of its participants, the types of questions they are 
capable of asking, and, therefore, the range of answers that they can provide.” Id. 
at 406. 
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work of historians, less so as a unitary and coherent EU 
constitutional culture, but rather as a more fragmented, contested 
legal practice that has to be understood in continuous interchange 
and struggle among Luxembourg, Brussels, Member States’ courts, 
parliaments, and their fragmented public opinions.12 Rather than 
lifting the “veil of legal Form to reveal living essences of power and 
need,” the new historians are engaged in a deeper reflection to show 
how law has played a significant role in creating major changes in 
European society.13 
The work of the New Legal Historians does not emerge in a 
vacuum. They are in the company of other scholars who are offering 
new, accurate narratives, often conflicting with mainstream accounts 
of European integration, for a critical understanding of its past and 
future. For instance, Peter Lindseth reminds us that the relatively 
autonomous EU courts draw legitimacy from their interaction with 
judicial, executive, and parliamentary branches of the Member 
State.14 The political scientist Kalypso Nicolaidis is departing from 
the stifling debate surrounding a pervasive democratic deficit in the 
EU and moving instead toward a third direction that involves 
imagining the EU as neither a state nor a federation, but as a 
“demoicracy” that supports a union of citizens and states governing 
jointly.15 More radically, Alexander Somek challenges the narrative 
of European citizenship as creating beneficial individual rights for 
EU citizens. Through a critique of rights, Somek shows the 
increasing alienation of the European bourgeois that has lost touch 
 
 12. BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST 
GERMANY'S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949−1979 (2012). 
 13. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 109. 
 14. See PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE 
AND THE NATION-STATE (2010). 
 15. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Idea of European Demoicracy, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW, supra note 7. 
“European demoicracy is a Union of peoples, understood both as states and as 
citizens, who govern together but not as one. It represents a third way against two 
alternatives which both equate democracy with a single demos: as a demoicracy-
in-the-making, the EU is neither a Union of democratic states as ‘sovereigntists’ 
would have it, nor a Union-as-a-democratic state to be as ‘federalists’ would have 
it. A Union-as-demoicracy should remain an open-ended process of transformation 
which seeks to accommodate the tensions inherent in the pursuit of radical mutual 
opening between separate peoples.” Id. at 254. 
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with its citoyen side still rooted in his home country.16 
This mapping of contemporary EU legal academia is essential to 
grasp the crucial contribution of the New Historian to the work of 
lawyers committed to EU law. While initially scholars studying the 
Luxembourg courts may have seen themselves as legal mandarins 
interpreting judicial opinions almost as if they were “divined by the 
Court,” later on with input by political scientists they shifted in 
analyzing more explicitly the relation between law and politics in EU 
law. The New Historians have infused in the work of lawyers a deep 
skepticism toward evolutionary functionalism, namely the notion that 
we need to conceptualize EU law according to a defined trajectory. 
Morten Rasmussen’s work shows that there is no pre-commitment to 
or against European integration, but rather a novel understanding of 
the forces that shaped and resisted the current European legal 
profession together with its legal culture and practice. 
II. MORTEN RASMUSSEN’S CONTRIBUTION 
It is often during times of crisis that creativity surfaces. The 
current EU crisis is opening new avenues for creative scholarship 
aimed at reflecting critically on the dominant narrative that has 
pervaded Europe’s legal consciousness. The project of Morten 
Rasmussen inserts itself nicely in this new trend that revamps the 
possibility of producing critical legal histories in EU law.17 The main 
idea is to depart from an “evolutionary functionalism”18 project that 
follows the evolution of EU law through developmental stages by 
tracking how, at every stage, law has satisfied the specific needs of a 
society. In this vein, the Transformation of Europe,19 Joseph H.H. 
Weiler’s influential history of EU law, created a powerful narrative 
of the different stages of European integration—the foundation, the 
mutation, and the Promised Land—often led by Europe’s judiciary 
branch. To overcome a political impasse in European integration, 
 
 16. See Alexander Somek, Accidental Cosmopolitanism, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 371 (2012) (relying on Karl Marx’s Jewish Question (1844)). 
 17. For more on Rasmussen’s collective research project, see Towards  
a New History of European Public Law, UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, 
http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk (last visited June 11, 2013). 
 18. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 59−67. 
 19. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 
2403 (1991). 
  
1178 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:5 
according to Weiler, the European of Court of Justice shaped the new 
constitutional order by relying on noble goals at the expense of 
democratic values.20 In Weiler’s legal history, there are three key 
moments of constitutional jurisprudence in which the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) defines the European legal order as 
detached and almost impenetrable from social and political life.21 
First is the creation, by the ECJ, of direct effect and supremacy 
doctrines to further political integration in the constitutionalization 
process. Second is the creation of a mutual recognition doctrine 
through which the ECJ could further market integration.22 Third is 
the ECJ’s human rights jurisprudence, which sought to address the 
democratic shortages of European integration.23 These are all 
moments in Weiler’s narrative, wherein the ECJ has silently, and 
often relying on diluted versions of democracy, proceeded to 
strengthen its constitutional order. This powerful narrative resonates 
with a functional determinist vision whereby law responds to societal 
needs that change according to a resolute evolutionary path. Because 
of its influence, such a narrative has been widely adopted by lawyers, 
scholars, and judges to show how EU law satisfies the growing needs 
of a society in search of greater political and market integration 
alongside strong democratic values.  
The methodology put forward by the New Historians gives us the 
opportunity to question functional determinist narratives of EU law 
that explain how each ECJ decision is part of a puzzle that creates, or 
fails to create, a more constitutional Union. Rasmussen’s meticulous 
work aims instead to situate the jurisprudence of the ECJ in a web of 
“multiple trajectories of possibility.”24 For instance, instead of the 
narrative of the quiet revolution, depicted by Weiler in the three 
phases (direct effect and supremacy, mutual recognition, and human 
rights), Rasmussen’s history shows that the chosen path was 
selected, “not because it had to be but because [1] the people pushing 
for alternatives were weaker and lost out in their struggle or [2] 
 
 20. See Weiler, supra note 7. 
 21. Id. at 154. 
 22. See Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
 23. See Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelgesshaft mbH v. Einfuhr- Und 
Vorratsstelle Gertreide, 1970 E.C.R. 1126. 
 24. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 112. 
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because both winners and losers shared a common consciousness 
that set the agenda for all of them, highlighting some possibilities 
and suppressing others completely.”25 By narrating these critical 
legal histories in EU law, we begin to appreciate how the legal forms 
and practices created by European political and legal elites were the 
product of struggles among groups with conflicting agendas, 
characterized by a particular historical context that has become part 
of our European legal consciousness—a relatively autonomous legal 
structure with an internal coherence.26 
Morten Rasmussen’s lecture began by explaining that the context 
of European legal integration was driven by low societal demand for 
legal adjudication at a time when legal access to Luxembourg was 
not easy for individual citizens of the Member States.27 This 
foundational moment, rather than a constitutional moment based on 
the spirit of the Treaties, was an intense battle of conflicting ideas 
and interpretations among legal and political elites that shaped the 
early nature of EU law. At that time, an intergovernmental approach 
competed with a constitutional, federalist vision. The High Authority 
and the executives of the Member States were tasked with the 
implementation of the Treaties, and the ECJ was not central to the 
implementation of EU law vis à vis national orders. In contrast, the 
constitutional vision placed the ECJ at the center of the new 
architecture, based on the ideas promoted by Walter Hallstein (the 
first German President of the EEC Commission), stating that this 
new type of international community must be subject to the rule of 
law—namely a Rechtsgemeinshaft.  
Rasmussen further explains how different groups of legal experts, 
originally inclined toward federalism, ended up bolstering the 
constitutional approach by introducing and refining the mechanism 
of preliminary reference under article 177 EEC of the Rome Treaty. 
This procedure eventually allowed citizens broader legal recourse to 
the ECJ, while simultaneously strengthening the constitutional and 
legal foundation of the system and creating the possibility for more 
 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 101. 
 27. See supra text accompanying note 1. For the article that resulted from the 
lecture, see Morten Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law: 
The New Contribution of Historians, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1187 (2013).  
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integration. In cases such as CILFIT,28 it becomes clear how the ECJ 
can use article 177 (267 TFEU) not only to domesticate the Italian 
Corte di Cassazione, but more interestingly to offer a savvy lesson in 
comparative law. From this judgment, the ECJ emerges as a skillful 
comparative law practitioner in interpreting complex legal concepts 
embedded in a variety of languages and diverse legal cultures. 
In addition, Rasmussen recounts how the breakthrough in Van 
Gend en Loos29 and Costa,30 two fundamental ECJ cases, was the 
byproduct of a number of factors: (1) the creation of a common 
market, (2) the constitutional changes in the Netherlands in the late 
1950s that allowed a large number of cases to be referred to the ECJ, 
(3) the creation of an international federation for European law in 
1962, and (4) the crucial appointment of two new judges (Alberto 
Trabucchi and Robert Lecourt) who favored federalism. Rasmussen 
then turned to the challenges inherent in the expansion of the Union 
and subsequent limitations in the 1970s. Up until this point, 
European public law was shaped by limited European elites. The 
post-1967 court—now presided over by Robert Lecourt and 
including federalist voices such as Luxembourg Justice Pierre 
Pescatore—moved beyond the conservatism of the earlier court and 
began to deepen its constitutional practices, which led to greater and 
more vocal opposition from the Member States.  
The 1970s marked the start of struggles between ideas and among 
political and legal elites regarding fundamental rights, and were driven 
mostly by the German Federal Constitutional Court in well-known 
cases such as Internationale Handelsgesellschaft31 and Solange.32 
Rasmussen relies on Bill Davies’s account of pervasive resistance to 
the ECJ in German administrative bodies, domestic courts, and civil 
 
 28. See Case C-283/81, Srl CILFIT and Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 
1982 ECR 3415; G. Frederico Mancini & David T. Keeling, From CILFIT to 
ERT: The Constitutional Challenge Facing the European Court, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 1 
(1991). 
 29. Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 2. 
 30. Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 587. 
 31. See Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelgesshaft mbH v. Einfuhr- Und 
Vorratsstelle Gertreide, 1970 E.C.R. 1126. 
 32. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
May 29, 1974, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 271, 
1974 (Ger.). 
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society33—which resulted in changes in the European legal system, 
determined predominantly by “national” concerns and pressure, and 
demonstrating the real co-constitutive impact of national receptions of 
EU law—to show that the conflict between national sovereignty and 
Union law came to only a partial end. The end result of these 
processes, at least as far as historians can tell into the mid-1980s, was 
a heavily contested European public law structure shaped by a broad 
range of actors, which saw the national systems and traditions play a 
co-constitutive role in the formation of essential aspects.  
Rasmussen’s historical account does not rest on a normative 
explanation of the constitutionalization of Europe. Rather, it depicts 
the constitutional practice of the court as a struggle driven by 
specific actors, providing for a revisionist historical account that 
departs from the classic constitutionalization narratives. These 
narratives include that of Eric Stein and Joseph H.H. Weiler on 
constitutionalization through the active role of the ECJ, Walter 
Mattili and Anne-Marie Slaughter’s constitutional dialogue between 
the ECJ and the national constitutional courts, and Alec Stone Sweet 
and Karen Alter’s inclusion of transnational and private groups to 
further the constitutionalization of the EU. As Rasmussen explains at 
the beginning of his article, the academic paradigm launched by 
Weiler and Stein in the 1970s was a strategic project to create a “new 
scientific paradigm” and demonstrate that the ECJ had become a 
political actor, explaining the success of the constitutional project 
and its relative acceptance by national courts. This adage has become 
common wisdom in EU law circles, despite the fact that it is 
unjustifiable historically. Instead, Rasmussen’s revisionist history 
shows that national resistance to the ECJ’s constitutional practice did 
not disappear. Rather, it continued at different times. Even the 
preliminary reference mechanism, if not backed up by the Dutch 
constitutional reform, remains a fragile tool since countries like 
Denmark, using political control of the judicial system, have ensured 
that courts never send cases to the ECJ. Therefore, we come to 
understand that contention, resistance, and co-constitution, instead of 
mere top-down, gradual, inevitable acceptance, shape the ECJ’s 
practice in the realm of public law.  
 
 33. See DAVIES, supra note 12. 
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III. THE RESPONSES:  
MARK POLLACK AND FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, 
MICHELLE EGAN AND BILL DAVIES 
In this part I pair the responses to the New History approach 
according to the authors’ important interdisciplinary contributions to 
the field of EU law. During the workshop, Mark Pollack responded 
to Rasmussen’s lecture with a suggestive shift of scholarly 
paradigms: if the 1990s were the Golden Age of law and politics 
research, today is the Golden Age of EU legal history. From the 
perspective of a political scientist, Pollack wonders about the lessons 
derived from a revisionist history and its mission for future research. 
In his detailed account, he shows how political scientists were 
affected by the constitutionalization narrative by developing 
particular scholarly agendas focusing on the ECJ.34 What is striking 
in Pollack’s elegant mapping of the political science scholarship on 
EU law is to understand the competing and conflicting disciplinary 
approaches tackling, for instance, the question of judicial 
independence of the ECJ. On the one hand, some scholars portrayed 
the ECJ as constrained by the Member States, while others depicted 
the ECJ as a highly independent court.35 While political scientists and 
international relations scholars were fighting over this turf, legal 
academics were either on board with the constitutional paradigm in 
European public law or busy forming and resisting the creation of a 
European private law consciousness with its own vocabulary and 
comparative legal culture.36 
In his paper Pollack shows the overlap between the scholarly 
agenda of political scientists and New Historians in what he calls the 
relationship between the ECJ and the national courts. He compares 
the finding of political scientists with the findings in Bill Davies’s 
book,37 broadening our understanding of the German resistance, not 
limited to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, to the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence. Pollack wants to show that, despite a similar aim, the 
 
 34. See Mark A. Pollack, The New EU Legal History: What’s New, What’s 
Missing?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1257 (2013). 
 35. See id. at 1264−65. 
 36. See Fernanda Nicola, Transatlanticisms: Constitutional Asymmetry and 
Selective Reception of U.S. Law and Economics in the Formation of European 
Private Law, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 87 (2008). 
 37. See Pollack, supra note 34, at 1293−1301 (citing DAVIES, supra note 12). 
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disciplinary constraints make historians highlight particularities and 
idiosyncrasies emerging in European integration, whereas political 
scientists are tempted to draw comparative conclusions between 
different Members States’ attitudes toward the reception of EU law.38 
However, what appears as a disciplinary constraint in Pollack’s paper 
becomes a normative commitment on how we understand the 
relation between law and society in Francesca Bignami’s paper. 
Francesca Bignami brings comparative law insights to the 
discussion.39 Comparative lawyers are trained in the theoretical 
debates and the practice of legal transplants, namely showing why 
and how law adapts and changes to a different legal context when it 
travels. As Bignami highlights, the New Historians contribute to the 
comparative law tradition in the Watson sense, to show which legal 
networks of scholars, lawyers, and judges have shaped the European 
constitutional practice.40 Bignami goes deeper to show how the 
domestic law of the Member States has provided not only different 
case-studies of resistance versus acceptance but more importantly an 
understudied aspect, namely a “crucial springboard for the new law 
of the European Community.”41 If EU law influences the public—
and private—law of the Member States, Bignami calls this a 
downward transfer of law into national systems, which appears the 
main focus of political scientists.  
The contribution of the New Historians is in tune with the 
comparative law agenda of tracing the upward transfers of domestic 
rules that shape EU law as a relatively autonomous legal sphere. In 
such transfers we can detect the creation of a European legal 
consciousness,42 not a coherent doctrinal apparatus detached from 
society, but rather competing and conflicting approaches to legal 
concepts, judicial techniques, and social values that through 
compromises or unintended consequences shape the current 
 
 38. See id. 
 39. Francesca Bignami, Rethinking the Legal Foundations of the European 
Constitutional Order: The Lessons of the New Historical Research, 28 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1311 (2013). 
 40. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1970). 
 41. See Bignami, supra note 39, at 1315. 
 42. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT, 1850−1940 (2006) 
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European constitutional practice.43 
The essay by Michelle Egan brings to the fore the comparative EU 
and U.S. federal dimension as a way to better understand the political 
economy of European integration and how law played a crucial role 
“seeking to balance both public power and private rights.”44 In her 
essay she refers to the literature that began in the mid-1980s on 
“integration through law” with the explicit task of comparing 
European integration to the U.S. federal experience.45 In her view, 
such comparison is still relevant in better understanding the politics 
of judicial empowerment or the federal struggle over social welfare 
across the Atlantic. Egan is committed to continue a transatlantic 
comparative scholarly project that for many reasons has today lost its 
appeal.46 
Egan highlights that the work of the New Historians is revealing in 
the creation of a particular professional identity, yet it offers little 
guidance in addressing bigger causal questions such as the 
relationship of law to contemporary democracy and to the market as 
a comparative US−EU history would reveal. A response to Egan 
comes from Bill Davies,47 who states the agenda of the New 
Historians is purposely limited in scope—the focus on constitutional 
practice—and in scale—in Fernand Braudel’s longue durée tradition 
of small stories that need to be told to understand a large-scale 
phenomenon such as European integration.48 Yet Davies agrees that 
while, in the U.S. realist tradition, more biographies and studies have 
influenced the study of U.S. constitutional law, very limited work 
has been put forward offering a “picture of a European justice’s 
preferences.”49 Even though the European context remains radically 
 
 43. See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
 44. Michelle Egan, Toward a New History in European Law: New Wine in Old 
Bottles?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1223, 1226 (2013). 
 45. See 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL 
EXPERIENCE (Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe, & Joseph Weiler eds., 1985). 
 46. See Caruso, supra note 10. 
 47. Bill Davies, Why EU Legal History Matters—A Historian’s Response, 28 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1337 (2013). 
 48. See FERNAND BRAUDEL, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATIONS (trans. Richard 
Mayne, 1993); for an application of Braudel’s insight into U.S. legal micro-history, 
see Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 899. 
 49. See Davies, supra note 47, at 1345. 
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different from the U.S. one, and in a civil law tradition this type of 
study is in itself less relevant than in the common law tradition, 
Davies is committed to advancing our knowledge in this realm in 
order to expose the internal and external forces that control and 
shape the legal discourse of European courts. 
The last central issue that Davies addresses in his essay is the hard 
choice that he is directly or indirectly asked to make, especially by 
Egan and Pollack, namely the choice between what he calls applied 
versus pure history, or in the realm of social science presentism 
versus historicism. If a pure history is more scientific, the applied 
history is mostly concerned with its use in current struggles. Davies 
responds to what Martti Koskenniemi called an existential 
dichotomy, positioning the New Historians in two places at the same 
time.50 Historians are asked to write a history of the past, but the very 
act of writing reflects the desire to intervene in the present. Davies 
admits that the New Historians are committed to an “‘indirect 
applied’ legal history that finds little need to redraw theoretical 
models but whose work is so embedded in the ‘contemporary’ period 
that it cannot be anything other than applicable for understanding 
today’s world.”51 
We are living in an era in which legal education is under attack, in 
which resources are scarce. It would be easier to make flamboyant 
claims about the end of the European Union or its hegemonic role as 
a global actor than to commit to a careful and well-researched 
scholarship. The New Historians are offering an important avenue of 
research to better understand what has happened in EU law together 
with a lesson in self-awareness geared to legal scholars, lawyers, and 
judges shaping European legal consciousness. 
 
 
 50. See Martti Koskenniemi, Address at the “Histories of International Law — 
Significance and Problems for a Critical View” Workshop (Temple Law School, 
April 12−13, 2013) (ending his lecture with the image of a detective on the ruins 
saying, “The world is a disaster and I have nothing to offer to help you figure it 
out. My work is that of a detective . . . to say ‘who dunnit?’”). 
 51. See Davies, supra note 47, at 1351. 
